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Protecting 
Transgender Families: 
Strategies for Advocates 
By Taylor Flynn 
Divorce is never easy. Your life partner may now be a bitter 
enemy, your means of eco-
nomic support may be in 
jeopardy, and custody of your 
children may be at risk. How 
could the stakes be any high-
er? Ask Michael Kantaras, 
J'Noel Gardiner, Kristie 
Littleton, or any of the mar-
ried transgender women and 
men in the United States. For a 
Michael Kantaras (center) with his attorneys from 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Karen Doering 
(left) and Shannon Minter (right) 
transgender (trans) man or 
woman, what begins as the dissolution 
of a relationship may be transformed into 
a public nightmare in which the individ-
ual is forced to defend the authenticity of 
his or her gender in the face of relent-
less, brutal, and humiliating questions 
about the most intimate details of per-
sonal anatomy and sexual practices. 
In 2002 this possibility became a reali-
ty for Michael Kantaras, a transsexual man 
in Clearwater, Florida. Although born with 
female genitalia, Michael grew up with a 
deep-seated identity as a male. In 1985, 
at the age of twenty-three, Michael went 
through the difficult process of making his 
life congruent with his sense of self by 
undergoing sex-reassignment, including 
hormone therapy, chest surgery, and sur-
geries to remove his internal female geni-
talia. A few years later, Michael fell in 
love and married Linda Kantaras, after 
telling her about his transgender status. At 
the time they married, Linda had an infant 
son from a prior relationship. Michael 
adopted Linda's son, and the couple had 
a second child through alternative insemi-
nation. Michael and Linda were married 
for ten years. When Michael filed for 
divorce, the court-appointed custody eval-
uator concluded that he was by far the 
more stable and qualified parent and rec-
ommended that he be given primary cus-
tody of the couple's two children. 
Instead of focusing on the children's 
best interests, however, the proceedings 
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very quickly centered on Linda's claim 
that Michael was legally female, which, 
if accepted by the court, would have 
rendered their marriage a legally invalid 
same-sex union and jeopardized 
Michael's parental rights. Drawing on 
anti-gay case law holding that, absent 
adoption, nonbiological gay and lesbian 
parents have no legal rights to their chil-
dren, Linda argued that Michael was not 
a legal parent of the child born through 
alternative insemination. Linda also 
argued that Michael's adoption was 
invalid because Florida bans adoption by 
gay and lesbian parents. In short, 
Michael faced not only the loss of cus-
tody but also the loss of any right to be 
considered a parent inthe eyes of the 
law or to maintain any contact with his 
children. With a signature from a judge's 
pen, his marriage, his parenthood, and 
even his gender could be erased. 
In a three-and-a-half-week trial tele-
vised on Court TV, Michael and other 
witnesses were grilled about the appear-
ance of Michael's body, the shape and 
size of his genitalia, his sexual capaci-
ties and practices, his ability to urinate 
standing up, and the details of his med-
ical diagnosis and treatment as a trans-
sexual person. Fortunately, the trial 
judge ultimately found Michael to be 
legally male, affirmed the validity of his 
marriage, and granted him custody of 
both children in an 800-plus-page deci-
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sion issued on February 21,2003. 
Available at www.transgenderlaw.org. 
Just a few months later, in April 2003, a 
trial court in Chicago came to the oppo-
site conclusion in a case involving simi-
lar facts. In Chicago, the trial judge 
ruled that Sterling S., a transsexual man 
who had undergone extensive medical 
treatment and lived exclusively as a man 
for more than twenty years, was 
nonetheless legally female, that his fif-
teen-year marriage to his wife Jennifer 
was invalid, and that he was not a legal 
parent to the couple's ten-year-old son. 
Both decisions are now on appeal. 
Two other decisions involving trans-
gender spouses have made the headlines 
in the past few years. Christie littleton is a 
transsexual wornan residing in Texas. After 
Christie's husband died in surgery, she 
fried a medical malpractice claim. The 
doctor responded by arguing that the cou-
ple's marriage was invalid and that she 
did not have standing to bring a wrongful 
death claim. The trial court dismissed 
Christie's claim on that basis. The Texas 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, 
concluding that "Christie was created and 
bom a male" and continued to be legally 
male, regardless of her gender identity or 
how much medical treatment she had 
undergone. littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 
223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). Shortly there-
after, J'Noel Gardiner, a transsexual 
woman in Kansas, faced a similar chal-
lenge to the validity of her marriage, with 
a similar outcome. When J'Noel's husband 
died intestate, his estranged son sued to 
invalidate the couple's marriage in order to 
inherit their estate. The trial court ruled in 
the son's favor, and the Kansas Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court decision in 
an opinion that drew heavily upon the 
decision in Uttleton. Estate of Gardiner, 42 
P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
As advocates for transgender spouses 
and parents, lawyers can at least strive to 
protect their clients from such devastation 
by educating the court on key issues con-
cerning transgender identity and present-
ing the court with persuasive legal 
arguments for relying on a transgender 
person's gender identity, rather than spe-
cific medical treatments, to determine the 
person's legal sex. 
Overview ofTerms 
Traditionally, "sex" refers to a person's 
sexual anatomy, whereas "gender" refers 
to the qualities society considers mascu-
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line or feminine. "Transgender" is an 
umbrella term that encompasses all peo-
ple who are gender nonconforming, 
such as transsexual and intersexed per-
sons, "masculine" women or "effemi-
nate" men, and gay, bisexual, and 
lesbian people. As the following discus-
sion suggests, however, the distinction is 
not always clear, and the terms often are 
used interchangeably. An extensive body 
of medical and psychological knowledge 
demonstrates that sex is not a rigid male-
female binary but a sum of components, 
including physical characteristics (exter-
nal and internal reproductive organs, 
chromosomes, hormones, and secondary 
sex characteristics) and gender identity, 
or a person's internal psychological iden-
tification as female or male. The compo-
nents typically line up so that birth 
anatomy corresponds to gender identity. 
In transsexual people, the individual's 
physical characteristics correspond to 
one sex while gender identity corre-
sponds to the other. Trans men like 
Michael Kantaras and Sterling S. are 
often known as female-to-male transsex-
uals (FTMs); trans women like Christie 
Littleton and J'Noel Gardiner may be 
known as male-ta-female transsexuals (or 
MTFs). In 1979, an international organi-
zation of medical and psychological 
experts began developing a medical pro-
tocol, or standards of care, to provide 
gUidelines for the diagnosis and treat-
ment of transsexual people. Available at 
www.hbigda.org. These guidelines are 
designed to ensure that each patient 
receives an individualized assessment to 
determine which medical treatments, if 
any, are necessary to bring the person's 
gender presentation or anatomy into har-
mony with his or her gender identity. 
Another group of people--estimated at 
one in 2,OO~s bom intersexed, which is 
the contemporary term used to describe 
people who possess a combination of 
physical characteristics typically associated 
with both males and females. For exam-
ple, intersexed people may have ambigu-
ous genitalia or chromosomes that do not 
neatly fit into the categories of XX or XY. 
When a person's gender identity and phys-
Summer 2003 
ical characteristics conflict, medical and 
psychological experts overwhelmingly 
agree that gender identity is the primary 
determinant of sex, not anatomy. 
A Judicial Split 
Judicial approaches to determining a 
person's legal sex generally fall into two 
camps. The majority approach ignores 
decades of medical and psychological 
data to conclude that sex is determined 
exclUSively and unchangeably by a per-
son's genitalia at birth. Courts adopting 
this approach often invoke God or nature. 
In Christie Littleton's case, for instance, the 
court framed the issue as whether sex is 
"immutably fixed by our Creator at birth" 
and concluded, "There are some things 
we cannot will into being. They just are." 
Littleton, 9 S.w.3d at 224,231. 
In J'Noel Gardiner's case, the Kansas 
Supreme Court case looked to Webster's 
Dictionary for the definition of "sex," con-
cluding that transsexual people do not fit 
within that definition and hence are not 
covered by Kansas's marriage statute. 
"The words 'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in 
everyday understanding do not encom-
pass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary 
meaning of 'persons of the opposite sex' 
[found in the marriage statute] contem-
plates a biological man and a biological 
woman and not persons who are [trans-
sexual]." Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120. 
In contrast, a small but growing minor-
ity of courts in the United States and 
internationally have concluded that the 
legal sex of transgender litigants is the sex 
corresponding to their gender identity. As 
early as 1976, a New Jersey court ruled 
that a transsexual woman was legally 
female, stating that when birth anatomy 
and gender identity conflict, the role of 
anatomy is secondary. M. T. v.}. T., 355 
A.2d 204 (N.J. Sup. 0. 1976). In a more 
recent decision, an Australian family court 
similarly upheld the validity of a marriage 
involving a transsexual man. The court 
cited expert testimony that "brain ... or 
mental sex .... [is thought to] explain 
the persistence of a gender identity in the 
face of ... external influences" and con-
cluded that the transgender litigant in the 
case "is and always has been psychologi-
cally male." Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 131, 
132 (discussing In re Kevin). 
In Kantaras, the Florida trial court 
reviewed the extensive medical and psy-
chological testimony presented in the 
case and concluded, based upon that tes-
timony, that gender identity is the primary 
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determinant of sex. The judge stated, 
"There should be no legal barrier, cogniz-
able social taboo, or reason grounded in 
Florida public policy to prevent Michael's 
{being declared legally male! .... From a 
medical standpoint, Michael is of the 
male gender and has been his entire life." 
As the opinions in these cases suggest, 
because gender identity is fixed at a 
young age, trans people do not "change" 
their sex; rather, they bring their gender 
presentation or anatomy into harmony 
with their gender identity. 
The Gender Identity Standard 
That transsexual ism is a recognized 
medical condition with an established 
course of treatment raises the issue of 
whether specific procedures, such as 
hormone therapy or surgical interven-
tions, will be required for a person to be 
legally recognized as male or female. 
Ideally, courts should apply the stan-
dard used by medical and psychological 
experts: that a person's sex is determined 
by his or her gender identity. In Kantaras, 
for example, the trial court rightly con-
cluded that it would be absurd to withhold 
legal recognition of Michael's male gender 
given that Michael's gender identity was 
male, that he had undergone extensive 
and irreversible medical treatments for the 
purpose of sex-reassignment, and that he 
was seen and accepted as a man by every-
one in his daily life, including family, 
friends, employers, and acquaintances. 
Although Michael had not undergone a 
phalloplasty (the surgical construction of a 
penis), the court did not find this to be dis-
positive in view of the uncontested expert 
testimony that Michael's gender identity 
was unambiguously male and that he 
had completed all of the medical 
treatments recommended to him by his 
doctors and therapiSts. 
In Kantaras, the judge specifically 
acknowledged and relied upon the exten-
sive medical information presented in the 
case, including testimony that many med-
ical experts on transsexual ism counsel 
against phalloplasty because it presents 
risks of permanent loss of orgasmic capa-
bility, severe scarring, and irreversible 
damage to the urethra. Moreover-in 
addition to the cost, which may exceed 
$100,00O-medical technology has not 
advanced to the stage where the proce-
dure results in a functioning penis. 
Because the medical establishment can 
surgically construct fully functioning vagi-
continued on page 23 
Human Rights 
ly law that will promote the best inter-
ests of the children involved. 
1iffu~;·L: Rli-;;';~~-;~·the legal direc~;;;'-;hhe 
Center for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Transgender 
Employees 
continued from page 72 
prongs is entitled to protectio~ under . 
the state disability discrimination proVI-
sions. Several state human rights com-
missions across the country, including 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, 
have interpreted state disability laws to 
include transgender people. 
Some transgender people experi-
ence gender dysphoria (generalized 
discomfort or unease about birth gen-
der) and, as a result, can easily 
demonstrate that they have an 
"impairment" under the terms of the 
relevant state statutes. At the same 
time, they may be uncomfortable 
about embracing a psychiatric diagno-
sis, which still carries the possibility of 
stigma in some areas of society. Even 
among those in the transgender com-
munity who reject the psychiatric . 
model, most do not reject the premise 
that being transgender is likely a med-
ical condition caused by biological 
factors that are not yet fully under-
stood-and a growing body of scien-
tific research supports this conclusion. 
Many trans gender employees face 
discrimination in the workplace. 
Lawyers may look to several sources of 
law in order to redress the rights of 
transgender clients who face adver~e 
treatment in such situations, includmg 
transgender-specific nondiscrimination 
laws, state and federal sex discrimina-
tion laws, and state disability laws. 
Although courts historically have 
found transgender people excluded 
from coverage under certain laws, 
developing case law supports the argu-
ments of transgender employees who 
face workplace discrimination. 
Jennifer Levi is a senior staff attorney at 
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders 
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(GLAD). She works on a wide range of 
cases defending the civil rights and civil 
liberties of gay men, lesbians, and trans-
gender people. She was lead coun~el in 
the case of Doe v. Yunits, representmg a 
transgender student denied the right to 
attend school because of her clothing. 
Transgender 
Families 
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nas but not penises, reliance on surgery in 
this situation would have a starkly differ-
ent impact on trans women than trans 
men. In view of these considerations, the 
judge in Kantaras declined to hold that 
phalloplasty is required for a transgender 
woman to be recognized as legally male, 
since any such requirement would be at 
odds with current medical knowledge 
and practice. In contrast, in the Chicago 
case, the trial court relied on the "lack" of 
genital reconstructive surgery to declare 
Sterling S. to be legally female, desp.ite his 
male gender identity, extensive medical 
treatments, and twenty-plus years of living 
and being accepted as a man. 
That the court's decision in Kantaras 
was shaped by expert medical testimony 
strongly suggests that providing such 
medical data is advisable to ensure that 
courts have the information they need to 
make informed decisions. The fact that 
the opinion was 800 pages long raises 
questions, however. If courts require 
extensive expert evidence and undertake 
detailed, individualized inquiries into a 
person's medical history, what recourse 
exists for clients who do not have access 
to experts or adequate medical care~ Will 
certain surgeries or hormonal therapies 
become required? What if the client does 
not believe medical treatment is appro-
priate for him- or herself? 
While courts desperately need the 
kinds of information provided to the judge 
in Kantaras, that court's complex, highly 
medicalized inquiry has the potential to 
create almost as many problems as it 
solves. The better approach is for courts to 
point to the medical standards of care, 
which conclude that sex is determined by 
gender identity: the court then needs only 
to look to the person's gender identity to 
determine his or her legal sex. Recognition 
of gender identity should provide the law 
with a consistent, relatively simple 
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approach that accords with medical~y 
accepted standards yet at the same time 
permits the flexibility that the standards of 
care contemplate. 
Annulment of Marriage 
Despite excellent lawyering, a court 
may follow the majority of courts and 
invalidate the client's marriage. What 
does this mean for custody? Under 
early American law, when a marriag~ 
was invalidated or annulled, courts did 
not divide property or determine cus-
tody as they would in a divorce. 
Instead, these courts attempted to return 
parties to their "original" positions. This 
meant that property (which, at the time, 
included children) was returned to the 
property holders, who were men. As a 
result of such injustices, modern doc-
trine provides that, for purposes of 
determining property division, support, 
and custody, annulment should be 
treated just like divorce. See, e.g., 63 
A.L.R.2d 1008 (West 2002). Crucially, 
then, non-biological, transgender par-
ents should not lose their legal rights to 
their children simply because their mar-
riage has been annulled. 
Advocates representing transgender 
spouses and parents should be prepared 
to assert this doctrine in the event that 
clients are denied legal recognition of 
their gender. In the worst case scenario, 
one in which a court rules that a trans-
gender client is not a legal parent, the 
doctrine of functional parenthood may 
provide protection if the jurisdic~ion 
decides to follow the recent rulmgs by 
the highest courts in Massachusetts and 
New Jersey. Both courts held that, 
although the litigants had not adopted 
their partner's child, the nonbiological 
lesbian mother in each case was a full 
legal parent of the child. E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); 
\I.e. v. M.}.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1999). 
Pointing out that the doctrine applies to 
any person who meets the criteria, each 
court arrived at a similar, carefully crafted 
set of standards for determining function-
al parenthood-standards that most 
active parents should be able to meet. 
Taylor Flynn is an assistant professor at 
Northeastern University Law School. 
She was formerly a lawyer for the 
American Civil Liberties Union of 
Southern California, where she litigated 
several transgender rights cases. 
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